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Transport infrastructure investment is a cornerstone of growth-promoting strategies. 
However, the link between infrastructure investment and economic performance 
remains unclear. This may be a consequence of overlooking the role of government 
institutions. This paper assesses the connection between regional quality of 
government and the returns of different types of road infrastructure in the regions of 
the European Union. The results unveil the influence of regional quality of government 
on the economic returns of transport infrastructure. In weak institutional contexts, 
investment in motorways – the preferred option by governments –  yields significantly 
lower returns than the more humble secondary roads. Government institutions also 
affect the returns of transport maintenance investment. 
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Infrastructure investment has always been considered key for economic growth and 
has been one of the cornerstones of regional development strategies in the European 
Union (EU) and elsewhere. So intense has the focus on infrastructure been that 
formerly lagging regions have become leaders in transport infrastructure endowment. 
After 20 years of intensive European investment in transport infrastructure, Spain had 
the largest motorway network among the first 15 members of the EU, while Portugal 
leads in kms per GDP. The United Kingdom came last in the latter two rankings.  
 
However, whether efforts to promote greater economic, social and territorial cohesion 
by developing new transport infrastructure have delivered the expected economic 
results has come under considerable scrutiny. Recent scholarly literature has 
underlined that the returns of transport infrastructure investment have been more 
limited than that of expenditures in other development axes, such as human capital 
and innovation (Rodríguez-Pose and Fratesi, 2004; Crescenzi, 2005; Crescenzi and 
Rodríguez-Pose, 2012). But why this is the case is still unclear.   
 
One possible explanation posits that changes in accessibility deriving from new roads 
may benefit the economic core at the expenses of the periphery. This concept has 
been popularized in recent years by New Economic Geography (NEG) theories (Puga 
and Venables, 1997). A different possibility, which we explore in this paper, is that the 
returns of infrastructure investment are mediated by the quality of regional government 
institutions co-responsible for ensuring the selection and realization of specific 
projects. The local institutional environment in which investments are made will affect 
the scale and type of new infrastructure investments and, consequently, their 
economic returns. Poor institutions enhance the opportunities for private gain at the 
expense of a sound provision of public goods (Acemoglu and Dell, 2010). In weak 
government quality conditions new investment in transport infrastructure may respond 
more to political and individual interests than to economic and collective ones (Crain 
and Oakley, 1995; Henisz, 2002). Institutional failure is at the heart of a greater 
propensity to finance ‘flagship’ and large-scale transport projects (i.e. motorways, high-
speed rail), more appealing to incumbent politicians seeking re-election (Rodríguez-
Pose, 2000; Cantarelli et al., 2010), at the expense of less flashy ‘ordinary’ transport 
investments (i.e. secondary roads, freight railways). It may also lead to a more 
prominent role of political and business pressure groups, resulting in problems such as 
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collusion at tender-stage, misrepresentation of costs and benefits and of the time 
needed for implementation (Kenny, 2007; Flyvbjerg, 2009; World Bank, 2011).  
 
The role of institutions and of government quality as mediators of the returns of public 
policy – while increasingly acknowledged (e.g. Tanzi and Davoodi, 1997; Esfahani and 
Ramírez, 2003) – has seldom been proven empirically. To our knowledge, there are no 
analyses which have examined the triple link between quality of government, 
infrastructure investments, and economic growth for the European regions. We 
address this gap by analyzing the influence of transport infrastructure on economic 
growth both independently and in interaction with specific institutional characteristics. 
Our main hypothesis is that investing in transport infrastructure in poor or inadequate 
local government institutional conditions can seriously undermine the returns of the 
investment.  
 
We use the annual variation in the network of motorways and in all other regional 
roads as our proxy for transport infrastructure investment. Investing in these two 
infrastructure categories implies significantly different levels of visibility, costs, and 
potential economic returns. While additional investment in motorways requires a larger 
financial effort and often aims to improve inter-regional connectivity, investment in 
other roads tends to be substantially cheaper and generally target local bottlenecks 
and the strengthening of internal mobility within a region. Similarly, investments in new 
infrastructure may be preferred to the maintenance of existing infrastructure. Hence, in 
areas with a weaker quality of government, where the interests of individual actors 
may prevail over those of society as a whole, motorways – with their greater political 
visibility and greater corruption opportunities –. may be regarded as a more attractive 
option than secondary roads or road maintenance expenditure.  
 
We test our hypotheses on a sample of 166 EU regions during the period 1995-2009. 
Our estimation method (panel fixed effects) controls for unobservable time-invariant 
regional features and time-specific common shocks, as well as for the key time-varying 
regional growth determinants, such as innovation capacity, human capital and 
industrial structure.  
 
The results of the analysis provide little evidence of a positive correlation between 
regional investments in motorways and economic growth, even if associated with 
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better regional government institutions. In contrast, variations in the endowment of 
other roads display a stronger connection with regional economic performance in 
regions with higher quality regional governments. Also the maintenance of transport 
infrastructure is positively associated with economic growth only in regions with sound 
government institutions. 
 
2. INFRASTRUCTURE, INSTITUTIONS AND ECONOMIC GROWTH 
2.1 Infrastructure and economic growth 
A minimum level of public capital investment is essential for economic activity (Button 
et al., 1995). Infrastructure promotes local accessibility and leads to improvements in 
the provision of services, to reductions in production costs, to enhanced productivity 
(Biehl, 1991; Moreno et al., 1997), and to the relocation of economic activity, 
facilitating economic growth. However, once a necessary basic threshold of 
infrastructure provision is reached, the impact of additional public investment remains 
uncertain. A recent report claims that all OECD countries are already beyond that 
threshold and that additional road expansions will have limited effects on economic 
performance (OECD, 2009a).  Timing is also crucial, as the returns to infrastructure 
investment tend to be positive when new roads are built, but the positive impact fades 
away for incremental expansions of existing transport connections (Fernald, 1999). 
 
The notion of a positive linear effect of transport infrastructure investment on 
aggregate productivity (Aschauer, 1989; Munnel, 1990) has also been strongly 
challenged by subsequent economic research, both for the US (Holtz-Eakin, and 
Schwartz 1995; Kelejian and Robertson, 1997) and Europe (Cappelen et al., 2003; 
Crescenzi and Rodríguez-Pose, 2012). In the case of Europe, single country analyses 
(Cadot et al., 1999; Stephan, 2000), as well as cross-country investigations (Cappelen 
et al., 2003; Crescenzi and Rodríguez-Pose, 2012) report much lower elasticities than 
those found by Aschauer (1989) or even insignificant coefficients.  
 
The explanations as to why the returns of additional investments in infrastructure have 
not lived up to expectations vary. Some contributions have analyzed the dynamic 
response over time of regional GDP to public spending in transport infrastructure. 
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From this perspective, improvements in transport networks represent powerful growth 
stimuli only at specific moments, but have limited effects in other time periods. Leduc 
and Wilson (2012) demonstrated that motorway investment in US States had no 
impact on economic growth while road constructions were underway, an effect which 
became positive once the new infrastructure became operational. Other studies have 
shown, however, that most positive growth effects are short-lived. The connection 
between infrastructure and regional growth in Europe tends to vanish two or three 
years after it becomes available (Crescenzi and Rodríguez-Pose, 2008; OECD 
2009b).  
 
The differential impact of public capital on productivity, wages and employment has 
also been the center of attention. According to Dalenberg and Partridge (1997), public 
capital serves as a household amenity that increases labor supply with no impact on 
productivity. In their view, the weak productivity of US highways is explained by the 
fact that households may be willing to accept lower wages to live in places where 
infrastructure is more developed. In this case, the amenity effect may dominate the 
productivity effect, meaning that infrastructure investment has little or no effect on 
growth. 
 
Diverse conditions across different types of regions may also affect the returns of 
infrastructure (Fujita and Thisse, 2002). In particular, NEG analyses have focused on 
the role of different types of roads. Puga and Venables (1997), Puga (2002) and 
Ottaviano (2008) have distinguished between the economic effect of long-distance 
inter-regional transport infrastructure, which affects overall ‘accessibility’ and provokes 
further economic concentration, and short-distance or intra-regional infrastructure, that 
generally facilitates the diffusion of public services and the formation of human capital 
within peripheral regions. Studies outside the NEG framework focusing on core-
periphery differences in factor endowments have reached similar conclusions 
(Vickerman, 1995; Cappelen et al., 2003; Rodríguez-Pose and Fratesi, 2004).  
2.2 Governance and infrastructure investment 
One crucial factor behind the returns of transport infrastructure which has so far 
attracted limited attention is linked to the institutional conditions in each territory. The 
system of incentives and constraints shaped by local institutions and the efficiency of 
the local political administration influence the total returns to investment in transport 
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infrastructure (Crain and Oakley, 1995; Henisz, 2002; Acemoglu and Dell, 2010). 
Political and institutional factors may influence both infrastructure spending and its 
economic returns at every phase of the investment (Esfahani and Ramirez, 2003). 
From the planning and selection of transport projects to their implementation, the 
characteristics of the local governance system play an important role in determining 
future efficiency. The link between transport infrastructure investment and the planning 
system, the need for large budgets, the high number of actors involved, and the 
difficulty in applying effective control mechanisms make the transport sector 
particularly vulnerable to political interference (Wachs, 1989; Flyvbjerg, 2009; 
Cantarelli et al., 2010), corruption (Tanzi and Davoodi, 1997; 1998; Kenny, 2006), and 
collusion (World Bank, 2011). The quality of local institutions determines the risk of 
moral hazard and, consequently, the capacity of decisions on infrastructure investment 
to deliver.  
 
In the following subsections, we develop the conceptual and theoretical arguments at 
the base of our hypothesis at each stage of the infrastructure building process and 
posit that the economic returns of transport infrastructure investments are deeply 
affected by the presence of deficient governance. We integrate some significant case-
studies drawn from the European context in the discussion. 
Investment planning and project selection: political economy factors inflating transport 
investment 
Inadequate political institutions may negatively affect the economic returns to transport 
infrastructure investment well before the money is actually spent. Governments are 
directly responsible for appropriate infrastructure planning and rigorous project 
selection, making transport infrastructure planning and financing fundamentally a 
political topic. In theory, decision-makers should base their decisions on rigorous cost-
benefit considerations. However, decision-making on new transport investment in 
European countries is “generally politicized, rarely fully transparent, and there is little 
ex-post analysis on whether projects and policies meet expectations” (Short and 
Knopp, 2005: 363). Even when the investment is preceded by ex-ante impact studies, 
the secrecy which frequently surrounds forecasting methods does not guarantee the 
absence of deliberate cost-benefit misrepresentations (Wachs, 1989; Short and 
Knopp, 2005; Cantarelli et al., 2010). Incumbent planners may “purposely spin 
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scenarios of success and gloss over the potential for failure” (Flyvbjerg, 2009: 350) of 
transport projects in order to strengthen their own political positions.  
 
Infrastructure investment is very tangible and highly visible providing policy-makers 
with excellent opportunities for ribbon-cutting before elections with political 
considerations prevailing over solid economic valuation (Cadot et al., 2006). Vested 
political and economic interests can influence the activity of local administrations in 
weak institutional contexts, making the promotion of new large infrastructure projects 
preferable from a political perspective to investing in the maintenance of the old 
transport network or to the promotion of alternative, less ‘glitzy’ projects (Tanzi and 
Davoodi, 1997; Kenny, 2007). Special interests and pork-barrel politics can drive 
infrastructure investment decisions at the expense of social welfare and economic 
efficiency (Cadot et al., 1999; Kemmerling and Stephan, 2008). In addition, mega-
projects are riskier, due to long planning horizons, and more susceptible to cost 
miscalculations (Flyvbjerg, 2009): collusion and clientelism may also play an important 
role in this context (Cadot et al., 2006).  
 
Examples of political interest and/or weak local institutions leading to suboptimal 
infrastructure developments are plentiful. Many of those examples can be found in 
Spain. Substantial investments in motorways in the 1990s drove the catching-up 
process in transport infrastructure endowment. Yet, investment in infrastructure 
increased even further in the 2000s, when the road deficit relative to the countries in 
the core of Europe no longer existed (Bel, 2010). The wave of investment in 
motorways before the start of the crisis was mostly realized through toll road 
concessions that set favorable conditions for private groups (Acerete et al., 2009). The 
Spanish entrepreneurial sector threw its considerable economic weight in order to 
inflate investments in new roads, investments which were seldom – if ever – preceded 
by accurate cost-benefit analyses and by the drafting of financial and economic long-
term plans (Bel, 2010). The resulting roads often became ‘white elephants’ of 
questionable economic and public utility (Bel, 2010). Such is the case of the toll 
motorway connecting Madrid and Toledo (AP-41), inaugurated in 2006 with a 
forecasted traffic intensity of over 25,000 vehicles per day. The actual figures have 
been nowhere close,1 as the new motorway has not been able to divert enough traffic 
                                                          
1
 According to an official report from the ‘Ministerio de Fomento’ of Spain (available at: 
www.fomento.es/BE/?nivel=2&orden=06000000), the maximum number of daily vehicles was 
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away from its ‘competitor’, the pre-existing toll-free Madrid-Toledo motorway. The 
Spanish high-speed railway network can also be considered a rich source of ‘white 
elephants’ (Albalate and Bel, 2012). 
 
Another highly controversial project is the ‘Vasco da Gama’ bridge in Lisbon 
(Portugal), which opened to traffic in 1998 and is the longest bridge in Europe. It is the 
second bridge over the river Tagus, built in theory to alleviate the highly congested ‘25 
de Abril’ bridge. The project was financed using government grants, private resources, 
loans from the European Investment Bank and the Cohesion Fund, with the EU being 
the main contributor. The project was strongly promoted by the Ministry of Public 
Works of Portugal, supported by 17 municipal governments of the Lisbon metropolitan 
area and quickly approved by the European Commission, despite a dedicated 
commission identifying at least two other alternative and cheaper river crossings 
connecting more densely populated areas (Bukowski, 2004; Painvin, 2009). Partially 
as a result of its location the bridge failed to live up to expectations (Melo, 2000; 
Painvin, 2009). The estimated traffic of 132,000 daily vehicles never materialized, and 
in the first term of 2013 traffic across the bridge only reached 50,000 vehicles daily 
(IMT, 2013). The political desire to build the longest bridge in Europe and the need to 
spend European funds quickly prevailed over the necessity to reduce congestion in the 
city by using a more suitable alternative location for the project. 
Investment planning and project selection: lack of resources, corruption and collusion  
Superfluous or wrongly planned infrastructure investment may also be the result of 
inadequate policy-making and scarce economic resources. In cases when the 
responsibility for investment planning is decentralized, regional and local authorities 
may lack sufficient financial leverage to implement investments with higher returns. If 
political decentralization is not matched by an adequate devolution of economic power, 
financial instability and coordination problems may arise. In Italy, for example, the 
2001 constitutional reform transferred a large share of responsibility for the 
programming, planning, and managing road development to the regions. However, 
Italian regional governments have never had sufficient financial resources to properly 
exercise this role (Casadio and Paccagnella, 2011). As a consequence, the regions 
have either been forced to further decentralize powers to the provinces or to create 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
reached in 2008 with 2,800. The number of users has declined since then. The average for the 
first six months of 2013 was 1,300. 
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new ad hoc organizations for the management and realization of road investments 
(Marangoni and Marinelli, 2011). 
 
Next to a lack of financing capacity, local corruption is also one of the main factors 
behind the inefficient planning of public capital spending. In competitive auctions 
economic efficiency is best ensured when infrastructure projects are contracted to the 
companies presenting the best bid. This process requires a great degree of 
transparency. However, the auctions’ outcome is often perverted by corruption and 
collusion. In weak institutional environments bribery can lure government officials to 
select suboptimal bids or, in cases of limited contractors, collusion may be the 
outcome.  
 
Several studies have documented the existence of cartels controlling construction bids 
in European countries. A 2002 enquiry unveiled frauds, unjustified subsidies and 
bribery of vast proportions from a state-corporate network monopolizing the 
construction sector in the Netherlands (Van der Heuvel, 2005). In Italy the 
responsibility for managing auctions2 on highway and roads concessions belongs to 
the regions, with construction companies often lamenting a supposed lack of neutrality 
in the award of contracts. In the South of the country at least one third of projects are 
contracted to firms with close links to the awarding administration (Bentivogli et al., 
2011). Corruption and collusion in the transport sector are severe in many Eastern 
European countries as well (Kenny, 2006). In Romania a cartel of firms used to raise 
the price of road construction tenders by up to 30 percent over their market equilibrium 
level (Oxford Business Group, 2004). Numerous cases of pre-defined tender prices 
have also emerged in Slovakia (OECD, 2006) and Poland (Cienski, 2013).  
Project implementation: cost overruns and delays  
Cost overruns and delays tend to be the norm in the implementation of transport 
infrastructure projects in weak institutional contexts. According to Flyvbjerg et al. 
(2005), an underestimation of the total costs of large-scale infrastructure projects 
happens nine out of ten times with cost overruns in road projects on average 20 
percent above initial predictions. Political-economic factors are generally regarded as 
                                                          
2
 The national level is responsible for a few projects of national relevance (grandi opere), while 
the regional level manages all other auctions. 
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the main explanation for cost overruns (Cantarelli et al., 2010). In areas with weak 
institutions and governance systems, political and economic interest groups often 
voluntarily misrepresent the costs and benefits of a project in order to facilitate its 
approval.  
 
Increases in the total costs of infrastructural projects may be also related to distortions 
taking place at the moment of their execution. Legal disputes – often resulting from 
clashes between local authorities and the company implementing the infrastructure – 
can cause severe delays. Finally, additional time and cost overruns can be originated 
by the incapacity of legal institutions (either national or local) to enforce the project’s 
procurement contracts, and by the lack of appropriate bureaucratic structures 
monitoring the execution of works. 
 
Such conditions are more prevalent in areas where rent-seeking and/or the presence 
of organized crime abound. These endemic situations may help transform what initially 
appear to be feasible projects into ‘white elephants’, as was the case of the renovation 
of the Italian ‘A3’ motorway between Salerno and Reggio Calabria. Works began in 
1997 and, at the time of writing, are still underway. Meddling by organized crime – 
attested by the National Anti-Mafia Commission – together with lengthy court disputes 
have made costs skyrocket, with the Italian State providing compensation of over 300 
million Euros to the private contractors for ‘unpredicted costs’ (Turano, 2011). 
2.3 Infrastructure investment in the periphery 
Political meddling, delays, and unexpected cost overruns are frequently much more 
serious in the European periphery than in the core. As indicated by Charron et al. 
(2014), government quality in most regions of the European periphery is well below 
par. Many of the regions in the periphery of Europe have limited experience in project 
planning, monitoring and evaluation, along with greater problems of corruption, lack of 
transparency and accountability, inefficient rule of law and, last but not least, low 
government effectiveness. These conditions are perfect for the prevalence of political 
and/or individual criteria over economic and/or collective ones when designing, 




The impact of infrastructure projects in peripheral regions suffers as a result. Political 
instability, weak accountability, and ineffective governments limit the impact of 
infrastructure (Crain and Oakley, 1995; Henisz, 2002; Esfahani and Ramirez, 2003), 
whereas lobbying and corruption inflate expenditures in publicly funded projects (Tanzi 
and Davoodi, 1997; World Bank, 2011). This is particularly the case of large-scale 
transport projects that are politically appealing but have the effect of worsening the 
financial burden of a region, increasing the risk of a default. This risk becomes more 
serious if corruption is widespread. In these circumstances, the financing of debt is 
more costly and public investment projects less productive (Ciocchini et al., 2003; 
Ahlin and Pang, 2008).   
 
Institutional and government failures – more prevalent in peripheral areas – are 
therefore likely to emerge as barriers for the transformation of transport infrastructure 
investment into new economic activity and development. However, despite the 
salience of local institutions and government quality in determining how infrastructure 
shapes economic performance, only a limited number of empirical studies have 
attempted to assess the effect of institutions on the economic returns of infrastructure. 
Research by Tanzi and Davoodi (1997) and Esfahani and Ramirez (2003) uncover a 
positive role of institutional quality on economic growth, acting through the channel of 
more efficient and productive investments in infrastructure. These analyses are, 
nevertheless, conducted at a national level, with no focus on how the quality of 
regional government shapes the returns of transport infrastructure investments in the 
regions of Europe. 
3. EMPIRICAL MODEL AND REGRESSION RESULTS 
3.1 Model specification and data 
The aim of the empirical analysis is to test whether the quality of regional government 
shapes the returns of infrastructure across the regions of Europe. Different typologies 
of transportation investment are considered. We distinguish between variations in the 
endowment of motorways and of other regional roads, assuming that this distinction 
would also reflect a set of structural differences in the investment based on political 
preferences for different types of roads, the financial effort required to implement them, 
as well as their potential association with economic growth. The influence of 
institutions on transport infrastructure is modelled through the inclusion of an 
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interaction term between our two proxies for investment in roads and the regional 
quality of government. The model takes the following form: 
 
∆ln 𝑦𝑖,𝑡 = 𝛼 ln 𝑦𝑖,𝑡−1 + 𝛽 ∆ 𝑰𝒏𝒇𝒓𝒊,𝒕 + 𝛾 𝑸𝒐𝑮𝒊,𝒕 + 𝛿(∆ 𝑰𝒏𝒇𝒓 × 𝑸𝒐𝑮)𝒊,𝒕 + 𝜂 𝛸𝑖,𝑡 + 𝜃𝑖 +
𝜏𝑡 + 𝜖𝑖,𝑡              (1) 
 
Where the dependent variable ∆ ln 𝑦𝑖,𝑡 = ln 𝑦𝑖,𝑡 − ln 𝑦𝑖,𝑡−1 is the annual change of the 
natural logarithm of GDP in region i (i.e. the logarithmic approximation of the annual 
regional growth rate).  𝑦𝑖,𝑡−1 is the annual lagged level of regional GDP. The main 
variables of interest in the model – marked in bold – are the growth rate of the regional 
stock of transport infrastructure, the regional Quality of Government (QoG) index 
(Charron et al., 2011), and the interaction term between these two variables. 𝛸𝑖,𝑡 is a 
vector of independent variables as controls, 𝜃𝑖 are regions-specific unobservable fixed 
effects, 𝜏𝑡 are year dummies, and 𝜖𝑖,𝑡 is the error term. 𝛼, 𝛽, 𝛾, 𝛿, 𝜂 are the parameters 
to be estimated. 
 
Given the absence of comparable data on regional expenditure for transport projects 
across countries, we use change in the regional endowment of road infrastructure as 
our proxy for infrastructure investment. The number of kilometers of roads normalized 
by thousand inhabitants is our indicator of infrastructure. Crescenzi and Rodríguez-
Pose (2012) show that results of growth models assessing the effect of roads 
infrastructure remain substantially unaltered if alternative standardizations are 
employed – e.g. kilometers of road divided by regional GDP or by squared kilometers 
of land. The variable in first difference is assumed to reflect the regional variation in 
roads resulting from successfully completed new infrastructural investments.  
 
Our variable accounts for all completed and fully functional infrastructure projects that 
can influence regional economic activity. However, being a measure of the ex-post 
outcome of the investment, it cannot account for time overruns in project construction 
or for financial waste from unfinished projects. More importantly, it does not capture all 
investments in road maintenance and improvement, which represent about 30 percent 
of total transport infrastructure investment in European countries during the 1995-2009 
period (OECD, 2011). For this reason, an extension of our work considers a more 
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complete model including a proxy for maintenance investment, only available, 
however, at the national level.  
 
In order to assess the role of local institutions on transport investment, we interact our 
infrastructure proxies with the Quality of Government (QoG) index, a survey-based 
indicator of government quality in European regions compiled by the Quality of 
Government Institute at the University of Gothenburg in 2009. The index was built on 
the basis of questionnaires gauging the quality and impartiality of public services and 
the perception of corruption by local citizens. Responses to the survey have been 
aggregated at the NUTS1 or NUTS2 level for the EU-27. In a later work, Charron et al. 
(2014) have extended the QoG index to a longer time-span by integrating it with the 
World Bank Governance Indicators (WBGI) (Kauffman et al., 2009), identifying in this 
way four different dimensions of government quality corresponding to the WBGI 
categories, namely control of corruption, government effectiveness, rule of law, and 
government accountability.  
 
We make use of the classification by the European Statistical Office (Eurostat) of 
regional roads into ‘motorways’3 – all dual carriageway roads – and ‘other roads’ – all 
other state, provincial, and communal roads. Motorways are more visible, costly to 
build, and normally connect urban centers across different regions. The development 
of local roads is much less politically glamorous and less likely to give rise to the same 
‘hub-and-spoke’ effects as motorways. 
 
The vector of controls 𝛸𝑖,𝑡 includes a number of factors influencing economic growth. 
In line with the endogenous growth approach and, as customary in the scholarly 
literature, the model controls for innovation capacity, human capital, and labor market 
structure (OECD, 2009b; Crescenzi and Rodríguez-Pose, 2012; Parent and LeSage, 
2012; Capello and Lenzi, 2014). Transport connectivity improvements determine the 
potential for a region to absorb and transfer new knowledge and ideas from/to other 
                                                          
3
 Eurostat defines a motorway as a “Road, specially designed and built for motor traffic, which  
does not serve properties bordering on it, and which: a) Is provided, except at special points or 
temporarily,  with separate carriageways for traffic in two directions, separated from each other, 
either by a dividing strip not intended for traffic, or exceptionally by other means; b) Has no 
crossings at the same level with any road, railway  or tramway track, or footpath; c) Is 




places. The capability of the regional economy to translate internal and external 
knowledge and innovation into economic growth, in turn, is deeply affected by the 
social and institutional conditions of the areas where economic activities take place 
(Cohen and Levinthal 1990; Fagerberg, 1994; Cooke et al., 1997;). The composition of 
the labor force, the level of skills, and the quality of regional governments determine 
the capacity of regions to remain competitive over time by making the best possible 
use of the available inputs (Rodríguez-Pose and Crescenzi, 2008; Rodríguez-Pose 
and Di Cataldo, 2015). We account for the main characteristics of the regional socio-
economic environment shaping regional competitiveness by including three different 
control variables: a) the natural logarithm of the number of patent applications per 
thousand of regional inhabitants, as a measure of innovation capacity; b) the natural 
logarithm of the percentage of employed people with tertiary education, as a proxy for 
human capital availability; and c) the share of employed people in the primary sector 
as a proxy for the upgrading of local skills.  
 
In addition, transport infrastructure investment affects economic performance beyond 
the geographical boundaries within which it takes place (Cohen, 2010). When a 
reduction in transport costs helps connecting economic activities with new markets and 
boost trade new transport infrastructure generates positive spillovers. When new 
transport connections lead to a loss of productive resources due to the emigration of 
skilled labor, the spillover effects become negative. We control for spillovers from 
infrastructure investment in neighboring regions with a spatial lag of the transport 
investment variable based on Euclidean distance.  
 
All controls are extracted from the Eurostat Regio database for the period 1995-2009 
(see Table A1 for the details and sources of the variables included in the analysis).  
 
The study is performed on a sample of EU NUTS1 and NUTS2 regions determined by 
data availability. Having included in the model measures of regional government 
quality, we select for all countries the spatial scale with the highest political meaning 
and reflecting a real capacity to have an influence on infrastructure investment and 
maintenance decisions. We also consider the regional level with the greatest degree of 
autonomy for implementing infrastructure projects. This implies using NUTS1 regions 
for Germany, Belgium, and the United Kingdom and NUTS2 in the remaining 
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countries: Austria, Czech Republic, France, Hungary, Italy, the Netherlands, Poland, 
Portugal, Romania, Spain, Sweden and Slovakia. The full sample covers 166 
European regions. Data constraints (Greece, Denmark, Croatia, Bulgaria) or the 
absence of regional sub-divisions at the NUTS2 level (Lithuania, Latvia, Estonia, 
Luxembourg, Malta, Cyprus), or lack of sub-national variation in the QoG Index 
(Finland, Ireland), prevent us from covering remaining EU countries. 
3.2 Descriptive statistics 
Table 1 presents the stock of kilometers of motorways and other roads in all countries 
in the sample at the beginning and at the end of the period of analysis. Spain and 
Portugal were the countries that witnessed the greatest expansion in their motorway 
network (Table 1). These two countries already enjoyed some of the most extended 
motorway network in Europe in 1995. Spain was second only to Austria for number of 
motorway kilometers per inhabitant. Between 1995 and 2009, Austria and Spain 
followed very different roadbuilding strategies: while Austria favored the development 
of secondary roads, Spain invested in motorways. In 2009 Spain was the European 
country with the highest endowment of motorways per capita: 2.45 times the average 
of the countries in the sample. Portugal followed with 1.69 times above the average 
(Table 1). Other countries with significant investments in roadbuilding, such as France, 
followed a more mixed strategy, combining new investments in motorways and in 
secondary roads.  
 
Overall, it is the European periphery where the bulk of the investment in motorways 
has taken place. Less developed regions have added around 1,400 kilometers more 
than regions of the EU core (Table 1). In more developed regions the transportation 
effort has been more geared towards secondary roads. Core regions have added more 
than 100,000 kilometers of secondary roads relative to peripheral regions during the 
period of analysis (Table 1).  
 
Table 1 also shows the government quality score at the beginning and end of the 
period. Government quality worsened almost everywhere in Europe. The countries 
with the lowest endowment of infrastructure in 1995, i.e. Romania, Poland, and Czech 
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Republic for motorways, and Germany, Romania, and Hungary for other roads, have 
all seen their QoG score drop in recent times.4 
 
 
                                                          
4
 If the places that witnessed the greatest improvement in QoG over 1995-2009 were places 
that historically had low levels of infrastructure and are only now catching up, then the initial 
stock of infrastructure could be considered an omitted variable in our model, potentially biasing 
the coefficient of the QoG Index and of the interaction term. However, a lower level of 
infrastructure endowment at the beginning of the period does not seem to be associated with 
greater improvements in government institutions. The pairwise correlation coefficient between 
average QoG growth and infrastructure endowment in 1995 is negative and insignificant for 
motorways (-0.055) and positive for other roads (0.444). 
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TABLE 1: Stock of motorways and other roads at the beginning and at the end of the period – countries in sample 
 
Motorways Other roads QoG Index 
 
kilometers Per thousand inhabitants kilometers Per thousand inhabitants    
 
1995 2009 Difference 1995 2009 1995 2009 Difference 1995 2009 1995 2009 Difference 
Austria 1,589 1,697 108 0.224 0.236 105,193 108,509 3,316 12.61 13.41 1.059 0.975 -0.084 
Belgium 1,665 1,764 99 0.135 0.134 139,575 141,901 2,326 11.63 11.59
a 
0.248 0.230 -0.019 
Czech Republic 361 730 369 0.032 0.068 55,243 54,990 -253 5.39 5.22 -0.455 -0.510 -0.055 
Germany 11,371 12,826 1,455 0.138 0.171 217,590 218,156 566 2.67 2.78 0.948 0.860 -0.088 
Spain 6,790 13,806 7,016 0.220 0.402 151,443 147,088 -4,355 5.18 4.71 0.527 0.073 -0.455 
France 8,275 11,163 2,888 0.158 0.212 948,963 1,031,114 82,151 21.50 21.67 0.372 0.452 0.080 




-0.392 -0.633 -0.241 
Italy 6,473 6,661 188 0.159 0.171 159,066 173,946 14,880 5.92 4.57 -0.170 -0.947 -0.776 
Netherlands 2,291 2,633 342 0.175 0.185 113,418 134,195 20,777 9.36
c 
10.21 1.183 1.215 0.032 
Poland 303 849 546 0.008 0.021 372,233 383,981 11,748 10.65 10.96 -0.520 -0.789 -0.269 
Portugal 671 2,705 2,034 0.100 0.278 
   
  0.585 0.132 -0.453 
Romania 113 321 208 0.004 0.013 72,746 81,392 8,646 3.18 3.80 -1.758 -1.978 -0.220 
Sweden 1,279 1,885 606 0.122 0.169 96,713 96,598 -115 15.96 15.41 1.173 1.412 0.239 
Slovakia 219 400 181 0.051 0.088 42,388 43,489 1,101 7.25
d 
7.41 -0.954 -0.817 0.136 
United Kingdom 3,422 3,674 252 0.058 0.059 407,628 416,002 8,374 7.83 7.60 0.917 0.689 -0.228 
All regions 44,375 59,682 15,307 0.119 0.164 2,590,193 2,962,697
e 
372,504 9.72 10.01 0.262 0.061 -0.201 
Less developed regions 10,911 19,295 8,384 0.065 0.125 800,276 931,945
e 
131,669 7.61 9.64 -0.257 -0.515 -0.258 
More developed regions 33,464 40,383 6,919 0.160 0.190 1,789,917 2,030,752 240,835 11.25 10.26 0.642 0.480 -0.162 
Notes: Less developed regions are all regions part of the ‘Objective 1’ program during 2000-2006; more developed regions are all regions not eligible for ‘Objective 1’ 
support; the values are sums in ‘kilometers’ columns and averages in ‘per thousand inhabitants’ columns. a / 2007 value. b / 2003 value. c / 1996 value. d / 1997 value . 
e / for Hungarian regions the sum is made using the 2003 value. 




Figures 1 and 2 combine data on transport infrastructure investment with regional 
economic performance during the period of analysis. Regions are classified according 
to their average per capita growth rate between 1995 and 2009 and their investment in 
motorways and other roads respectively. The figures confirm that countries in the 
Iberian Peninsula recorded the largest increases in motorways, with Hungary following 
suit. Other regions, such as Limousin in France, Mecklenburg-Vorpommern in 
Germany, or Småland and the Islands or West Sweden, both in Sweden, also 
witnessed considerable expansions in motorway endowment (Figure 1). The greatest 
improvements in secondary roads took place in the Netherlands, Sweden, Poland, 
Romania, central France, and central and southern Italy (Figure 2). The highest growth 
rates took place in Central and Eastern Europe and fundamentally in Poland and 
Romania. The lowest growth happened in France, northern Italy, and western 
Germany (Figures 1 and 2).  
 
FIGURE 1: Per capita GDP growth and motorways investment in the EU, 1995-2009 
 




FIGURE 2: Per capita GDP growth and other roads investment in the EU, 1995-2009 
 
Source: own elaboration with OECD and Eurostat data 
 
3.3 Estimation issues and regression results 
The empirical model specified in Equation (1) is estimated by means of fixed effects 
panel methods with the inclusion of time dummies. Clustered standard errors correct 
for possible problems of serial correlation and heteroscedasticity. The effect of spatial 
autocorrelation (i.e., the lack of independence among the error terms of neighboring 
observations) is minimized by introducing ‘spatially lagged’ variables among the 
controls that explicitly take into consideration the interactions between neighboring 
regions, thereby minimizing their effect on the residuals. The Moran’s I test confirms 
the lack of spatial auto-correlation in the residuals. In the interpretation, we focus on 
the relative sign and significance of the key coefficients rather than trying to discuss 




Changes in motorway endowment as investment proxy are analyzed first, with the 
results presented in Table 2. The first column refers to a baseline specification 
including initial GDP per capita, a control for the regional population, region and time 
effects. In the following specification (column 2), additional regressors are included to 
control for other key determinants of regional growth, i.e. the share of employment in 
the agricultural sector, a measure of regional innovative capacity (patent applications 
per thousand inhabitants), and a proxy for human capital endowment (the stock of 
highly educated individuals in the region). The model is completed with a spatially-
lagged variable controlling for transport investments in neighboring regions, obtained 
by weighting the infrastructure variable by means of a Euclidean distance matrix. In the 
first two specifications of Table 2 the QoG index enters the model in its original form, 
while in specifications reported in Table A6 in Appendix A it is de-composed into the 
four quality of government dimensions considered (control of corruption, rule of law, 
government effectiveness, and government accountability), in order to check if results 
hold as the governance elements interacted with infrastructure investment vary. 
Infrastructure proxy: motorways 
The baseline specification presented in Table 2 column (1) shows that both motorway 
investment and government quality are important drivers of regional growth. The 
significant and positive coefficient of infrastructure is in line with the neoclassical 
perspective emphasizing the centrality of public capital accumulation for explaining 
variations in aggregate productivity (Aschauer, 1989). However, when the model is 
completed with socioeconomic, educational, and innovation variables (column (2)) the 
coefficient of motorways investment sensibly reduces its magnitude and loses 
statistical significance. This is consistent with the hypothesis that development 
strategies centered on expenditure in new transport infrastructure may not be sufficient 
to stimulate the growth potential of every region (Vickerman, 1995).  
 
The insignificant correlation between motorways investment and regional growth can 
be interpreted in different ways. If transport infrastructure is provided optimally in EU 
regions, the marginal returns of additional expenditures is equal to zero and new 
investment would have no effects on growth. Another potential explanation it is to 
assume that new motorway investment attracts individuals willing to accept lower 
wages to live closer to transport junctions (Dalenberg and Partridge, 1997). In the 
latter case, the wage decrease may offset any positive economic stimulus derived from 
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the investment, hence determining a zero effect on total productivity. Alternatively, it 
may be that local development dynamics in some territories may depend less on the 
construction of new infrastructure and more on regional processes of knowledge 
generation, the presence of a highly-educated workforce, and socio-institutional 
conditions (Crescenzi, 2005; Crescenzi and Rodríguez-Pose, 2012). By contrast, the 
positive and significant coefficient of QoG is not altered by the inclusion of additional 
explanatory variables, meaning that the quality of regional institutions is strongly 
correlated to the economic success of European regions.  
TABLE 2: Motorways investment, quality of government and regional growth, 1995-2009 
Dep. variable: 
Change of log GDP  
Full Sample Less Developed Regions 
(1) (2) (3) (4) 
Lagged GDP  
-0.0302*** -0.0940*** -0.0422*** -0.123*** 
(0.0103) (0.0130) (0.0121) (0.0201) 
Investment in motorways  
0.126** 0.0847 -0.0286 -0.0478 
(0.0613) (0.0525) (0.0917) (0.0773) 
Quality of Government (QoG) 
0.0318*** 0.0346*** 0.0636*** 0.0603*** 
(0.00500) (0.00466) (0.0107) (0.00788) 
Interaction term 
Investment in motorways × QoG
 
-0.118 -0.0663 -0.184 -0.110 
(0.0856) (0.0739) (0.146) (0.103) 
     
Spatial Weight of investment in 
motorways 
 
0.784***  0.409** 
 (0.162)  (0.187) 
Agricultural employment  
 
-0.00285***  -0.00292*** 
 (0.000648)  (0.000829) 
Patent applications  
 
0.00657***  0.00748*** 
 (0.00171)  (0.00279) 
Human capital 
 
0.0158***  0.0417*** 
 (0.00469)  (0.0102) 
Regional population 
-4.46e-05*** -1.53e-05** -3.83e-05* 1.14e-06 
(1.21e-05) (7.52e-06) (2.06e-05) (1.12e-05) 
Region Dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year Dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations  2,293 2,269 960 936 
R
2
 0.377 0.458 0.361 0.449 
NUTS regions 166 166 70 70 
Notes: Clustered standard errors in parentheses; *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. 
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Higher scores in the QoG index or its components (see Table A6 in Appendix A where 
estimates for the individual components of the index are reported) are, however, not 
associated with increases in the productivity of new motorways. In all specifications the 
coefficient of the interaction term is not statistically different from zero at the 10 percent 
significance level. Therefore, while a more effective, accountable and transparent 
regional government is pivotal in the promotion of successful development policies, it 
may not suffice for translating new investments in motorways into higher growth. The 
spatially-weighted variable displays a positive and significant coefficient, implying that 
being surrounded by regions investing in new motorways generates network 
externalities which affect local growth positively. However, the results suggest that only 
some areas may be able to reap the advantages arising from the expansion of the 
motorway network, while other European regions may see their productive resources 
being lured away by new investments in motorways.  
 
Peripheral, isolated, and less economically advanced regions are most at risk of losing 
out from the potential agglomeration of economic activity linked to motorways. Hence, 
in order to gain a better understanding of how peripheral economies respond to 
changes in transportation endowment and government quality, we replicate the 
estimation of the model on a restricted sample of less developed regions – defined as 
those that were part of the ‘Objective 1’ of the EU Structural Funds during the period 
2000-2006. The less developed regions sample includes 70 NUTS 1 and 2 regions 
mainly from the Czech Republic, Hungary, Romania, Poland, Slovakia, as well as 
Eastern Germany, Southern Italy, Southern and Western Spain, Portugal, and 
Northern Sweden.  
 
Columns (3) and (4) in Table 2 report the estimation results for the less developed 
sample. Restricting the sample to the regions receiving the bulk of EU Structural 
Funds can suggest whether financial resources for the promotion of territorial 
Cohesion among EU regions have been allocated efficiently (Crescenzi, 2009). For 
many years, the highest share of EU regional development funds was allotted to 
transport infrastructure (Rodríguez-Pose and Fratesi, 2004). However the belief that 
growth in peripheral regions is best fostered through investments in ‘hard’ transport 
infrastructure connecting isolated and remote areas with the European economic hubs 
is not supported by our empirical results. New investments in motorways in lagging 
regions have not been associated with higher levels of growth, as indicated by the 
negative and insignificant coefficient (column (3), Table 2). In addition, the negative 
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and insignificant interaction term between new motorway investment and government 
quality highlights that higher investment in motorways is not significantly associated 
with regional growth, even if promoted by a relatively more efficient regional 
government.  
 
Consistent with the hypothesis that lagging areas need to strengthen local socio-
institutional development pre-conditions in order to stimulate their competitive 
advantages, column (4) in Table 2 indicates that social and structural factors – 
including human capital assets, innovation capabilities, and local government quality – 
are far more accurate predictors of regional growth that investments in motorways. All 
of these variables display a higher correlation with growth, indicating their importance 
in regions that, because of their peripherality, tend to be relatively less endowed with a 
skilled labor force, have a lower innovative potential,5 and lack a well-functioning 
institutional system of governance.  
Infrastructure proxy: other roads 
We now re-estimate the model with the annual change in kilometers of other roads as 
our infrastructure proxy. As before, we reproduce the estimation first on the full sample 
of regions (columns (1) and (2), Table 3) and then on the smaller sample of less 
developed regions (columns (3) and (4), Table 3). The number of observations is 
reduced to 161 and 66 respectively, due to data availability issues for Portuguese 
regions. The presentation of the estimation output follows the structure of Tables 2 and 
is reported in Table 3, while results for the individual components of the QoG index are 
reported in Table A7 in Appendix A. 
 
In the full sample – and, as was the case for motorway development – when we 
exclude control variables, infrastructure investments are positively and significantly 
correlated with economic growth (column (1), Table 3). This effect is, however, not 
robust to the inclusion of additional growth determinants in the model, providing no 
statistical evidence that an upgrade in the network of state, regional, and local roads 
                                                          
5
 These results suggest that growth-enhancing factors in lagging regions differ between Europe 
and the US. In contrast to the results for less developed European regions, the economic 
dynamism of US lagging areas seems to rely less than that of European regions on elements, 
such as the proportion of patent applications and the share of high-skilled employment (Stephens 
et al., 2013). 
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may independently act as an engine for growth (column (2), Table 3). Conversely, 
institutional quality is confirmed as a robust growth predictor (Table 3).  
TABLE 3: Other roads investment, quality of government and regional growth, 1995-2009 
Dep. variable: 
Change of log GDP  
Full Sample Less Developed Regions 
(1) (2) (3) (4) 
Lagged GDP  
-0.0252** -0.0901*** -0.0473*** -0.129*** 
(0.0101) (0.0140) (0.0138) (0.0218) 
Investment in other roads  
0.00102** 0.000607 0.00136 0.000401 
(0.000487) (0.000476) (0.00768) (0.000497) 
Quality of Government (QoG) 
0.0235*** 0.0246*** 0.0628*** 0.0595*** 
(0.00484) (0.00436) (0.0109) (0.00801) 
Interaction term 
Investment in other roads × QoG 
 
0.00157* 0.00234*** 0.00268** 0.00352*** 
(0.000829) (0.000873) (0.0128) (0.00118) 
     
Spatial Weight of investment in other 
roads 
 
0.00366**  0.00299 
 (0.00155)  (0.00204) 
Agricultural employment  
 
-0.00352***  -0.00339*** 
 (0.000626)  (0.000834) 
Patent applications 
 
0.00534***  0.00753*** 
 (0.00180)  (0.00276) 
Human capital 
 
0.0136***  0.0420*** 
 (0.00512)  (0.0134) 
Regional population 
-4.46e-05*** -1.53e-05** -3.56e-05* 5.04e-06 
(1.21e-05) (7.52e-06) (1.78e-05) (8.77e-06) 
Region Dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year Dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations  2,158 2,134 889 876 
R
2
 0.387 0.472 0.383 0.472 
NUTS regions 161 161 66 66 
Notes: Clustered standard errors in parentheses; *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. 
 
As mentioned above, the direct effect of new ‘other road’ infrastructure may not be 
captured by the data because of how the investment variable is constructed. Another 
hypothesis, however, is that investments have been successful in some regions, but 
have had only a limited effect on the aggregate productivity of others. If this is the 
case, the coefficient of the investment variable may suggest that the resources 
governments allocated to productivity-enhancing projects were partly offset by 
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interventions that ended up being wasteful and economically inefficient. As widely 
discussed in section 2, self-interested public officials may take investment decisions 
that do not represent socially and economically optimizing goals. A sound institutional 
environment where policy-makers are competent and averse to moral hazard 
behaviors sets the necessary conditions for transport projects to achieve economic 
success. The positive and statistically significant interaction term in all specifications of 
Table 3 suggests that investments in roads other than motorways, if associated with 
higher quality of government institutions, have a positive correlation with the economic 
performance of European regions.6 This confirms that the economic returns from 
transport investments are conditional on a number of institutional factors including the 
transparency of the local administrations, a government’s political and financial 
autonomy, the effectiveness of the judicial system, and the risk of corruption.  
 
Our results show that the quality of regional governments may have an influence on 
the profitability of investments in other roads, but play little role in making motorways 
investments more productive. It may also be the case that regions with lower 
government quality and weaker institutions may prefer or – whenever they are not 
directly responsible for the funding – demand motorways as a more flamboyant, 
visible, and electorally-rewarding investment than secondary roads. In either case, the 
outcome is the same: no influence on economic growth. By contrast, regions with 
better government quality that put greater effort on the overall road network are 
rewarded by higher levels of growth. 
 
Motorways also represent an important opportunity cost in development terms. 
Because of their cost, an emphasis in motorways tends to leave limited resources for 
other types of interventions. The upgrading of local roads, reinforcing the internal 
connectedness of a region, is generally cheaper and allows greater room for 
alternative (or complementary) interventions. Hence, the development of transport 
projects that are embedded in the local economic fabric and contribute to mobilize 
                                                          
6
 A different interpretation of the insignificant coefficient of investment in other roads may be that, 
at the margin, additional expenditures in secondary roads produce no effect on total output 
because the level of transport infrastructure in EU regions is already optimal. If this is the case, 
the positive and significant coefficient of the interaction term may imply that marginal returns are 
higher in regions with stronger governance because increases in the quality of government 
determine a more-than-proportional increase in total output. In other words, when investments in 
other roads are pursued in the framework of supportive institutions, they benefit from increasing 
returns to scale. 
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people, goods, and knowledge may truly bring about economic stimuli for all types of 
economies. When comparing the coefficients of the interaction term in Table 3, the 
positive effect of a mutual variation in other roads investments and government quality 
is higher for the sub-sample of less developed regions. This is certainly due to the 
higher importance of institutions for the economic development of lagging areas than 
in the core of Europe. These results point to the growth potential of well-targeted 
investments in secondary roads, which often tend to be disregarded by subnational 
governments, especially in those peripheral regions of Europe where the quality of 
government is well below the average.  
 
The control variables maintain the sign and significance reported in the previous 
version of the model. The coefficients for patent applications and a highly-educated 
labor force in the less developed regions subset (column (4), Table 3) is higher than 
the one observed in the full sample, showing that innovative capacity and a good 
endowment of human capital are more crucial for economic growth in the periphery 
than in the core of Europe. Quality of government in the periphery of Europe is a far 
more accurate predictor of regional economic growth than investments in motorways. 
Maintenance investment 
So far the analysis has considered only the effect of new finished road infrastructure 
projects on growth. However, a large share (about 30 percent) of total infrastructure 
investment has been devoted to maintenance and improvements of existing transport 
networks. The proportion of expenditures for maintenance varies significantly across 
European countries. Areas where investment decisions have been highly politicized 
have had a preference for new infrastructure over maintenance spending, due to the 
higher political returns of newly created roads.  
 
In this section we re-estimate the model including a control for investment in 
maintenance. In absence of data at the regional level, we resort to the OECD 
database, providing national-level statistics of annual expenditures for transport 
infrastructure maintenance subdivided by transport type. We consider two types of 
expenditures, total transport infrastructure and road maintenance,7 normalized by 
                                                          
7
 These two variables are available for all countries in the sample, with exception of the 
Netherlands, Germany, and Spain in the case of total infrastructure maintenance, and Germany 
and Spain, in the case of road maintenance. 
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national GDP. As before, we interact the maintenance investment variables with the 
Quality of Government index, in order to test if the effect of maintenance spending on 
regional growth varies depending on the local quality of government.  
 
The results of the extended model are presented in Table 4. Panel A (columns (1)-(4)) 
reports the estimates with the inclusion of total infrastructure maintenance, while Panel 
B (columns (5)-(8)) focuses on road maintenance. The coefficient of maintenance 
investment is always negative and, in the case of total transport infrastructure, 
statistically significant. Although this result may at first seem counter-intuitive, it may 
be related to the balance between the resources allocated to maintenance relative to 
new investments. Economists looking at the impact of these two types of investment 
on growth have argued that a minimum level of maintenance is required in order to 
display positive growth effects. Rioja (2003) has estimated that for Latin American 
countries maintenance investments in public infrastructure below 1 percent of GDP 
would have a negative effect on GDP change. In our case, the average investment in 
total transport is 0.64 percent of GDP for the full sample, and 0.79 percent of GDP in 
less developed regions (Table A2). Hence, this result may imply that maintenance 





TABLE 4: Maintenance investment 
Dep. variable: 
Change of log GDP  
Panel A 
Total transport infrastructure maintenance 
Panel B 
Road maintenance 
Motorways Other roads Motorways Other roads 
FS LDR FS LDR FS LDR FS LDR 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
Lagged GDP 
-0.0983*** -0.152*** -0.0824*** -0.152*** -0.0851*** -0.119*** -0.0770*** -0.125*** 
(0.0172) (0.0211) (0.0182) (0.0234) (0.0160) (0.0268) (0.0175) (0.0297) 
Investment in motorways  
0.114 -0.0415   0.0873 -0.126   
(0.0722) (0.110)   (0.0756) (0.128)   
Investment in other roads  
  0.000593 0.000430   0.000623 0.000486 
  (0.000465) (0.000486)   (0.000473) (0.000490) 
Quality of Government (QoG) 
0.0200*** 0.0478*** 0.0148*** 0.0537*** 0.0319*** 0.0613*** 0.0228*** 0.0624*** 
(0.00548) (0.00905) (0.00561) (0.00940) (0.00553) (0.00894) (0.00580) (0.00984) 
Interaction term 
Investment in motorways × QoG 
 
-0.0804 -0.144   -0.103 -0.102   
(0.0952) (0.108)   (0.0847) (0.119)   
Interaction term 
Investment in other roads × QoG 
  0.00193*** 0.00353***   0.00210** 0.00344*** 
  (0.000703) (0.00112)   (0.000833) (0.00114) 
Spatial Weight of investment in motorways 
0.962*** 0.602**   0.900*** 0.571*   
(0.268) (0.298)   (0.252) (0.311)   
Spatial Weight of investment in other roads 
  0.00136 -1.31e-06   0.00230 -1.29e-06 
  (0.00153) (0.00212)   (0.00154) (0.00215) 
Agricultural employment  
-0.00273*** -0.00277*** -0.00361*** -0.00337*** -0.00287*** -0.00310*** -0.00385*** -0.00387*** 
(0.000610) (0.000806) (0.000537) (0.000787) (0.000792) (0.00103) (0.000698) (0.00100) 
Patent applications 
0.00911*** 0.0119*** 0.00771*** 0.0126*** 0.00846*** 0.0102*** 0.00670*** 0.0101*** 
(0.00178) (0.00308) (0.00192) (0.00303) (0.00185) (0.00318) (0.00197) (0.00316) 
Human capital 
0.0179*** 0.0314*** 0.0148** 0.0343** 0.0206*** 0.0357*** 0.0163*** 0.0373** 
(0.00528) (0.0112) (0.00613) (0.0154) (0.00530) (0.0130) (0.00608) (0.0179) 
Regional population 
-3.22e-05*** -0.00013*** -3.88e-05*** -0.000103** -4.10e-05*** -0.000153*** -4.61e-05*** -0.000116** 
(1.12e-05) (4.04e-05) (1.19e-05) (4.13e-05) (1.23e-05) (4.29e-05) (1.28e-05) (4.35e-05) 
Transport infrastructure maintenance  
-0.00521** -0.00881*** -0.00405* -0.00845***     
(0.00234) (0.00272) (0.00240) (0.00290)     
Interaction term 
Transport infrastructure maintenance × QoG 
0.0176*** 0.0166*** 0.0129*** 0.0130***     
(0.00414) (0.00411) (0.00405) (0.00414)     
Road maintenance  
    -0.00484 -0.00119 -0.00181 -0.00239 
    (0.00567) (0.0119) (0.00571) (0.0126) 
Interaction term 
Road maintenance × QoG 
    0.00821 0.00239 0.00588 -0.000769 
    (0.00628) (0.0114) (0.00657) (0.0111) 
Region Dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year Dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations  1,637 710 1,514 650 1,793 710 1,670 650 
R
2 
within 0.443 0.429 0.443 0.438 0.420 0.395 0.428 0.413 
NUTS regions 122 55 117 51 134 55 129 51 
Notes: FS = full sample; LDR = less developed regions. Clustered standard errors in parentheses; *** 




A different interpretation is that the investment has limited effect on productivity, 
because a proportion of the allocated resources is not effectively spent for 
infrastructure maintenance, but rather controlled by interest groups through corruption 
or collusion mechanisms. This hypothesis is supported by the fact that the interaction 
term between government quality and maintenance expenditures is positive and 
significant for total transport infrastructure, but insignificant for road investment (Table 
4, column (8)). The significant interaction term between government quality and total 
transport maintenance holds both for the full sample and the sample of less developed 
regions, as well as for motorways and for other roads investment. This means that 
investing in the maintenance of the overall transport network (total transport 
maintenance) has more beneficial effects on economic performance, the higher the 
government quality of the region in which the investment is made. All other coefficients 
are in line with the ones reported in the previous tables.  
Robustness checks 
In this section we test the robustness of our estimation results. We consider a number 
of factors that may affect our estimates: the time-span employed in the empirical 
analysis, the specification of the model, and the endogeneity of our key variables. The 
results of the robustness tests are displayed in Tables A3, A4 and A5 in the Appendix. 
 
Changes in time-span. The literature on the relationship between infrastructure and 
growth has produced different results depending on the different time-spans 
considered. Our model has been tested on the 1995-2009 time period, but the results 
may not hold for different periods. We therefore test the robustness of our estimates to 
a change in time span by excluding the first four and last four years. Table A2 in the 
Appendix shows the results of the main model for the 1995-2005 and 1999-2009 
periods. The results of the analysis are confirmed for both sub-periods. Quality of 
government is a significant factor behind economic growth and infrastructure 
investment in other roads is associated with regional GDP growth only in interaction 
with the QoG index – this result being stronger in less developed regions. The 
coefficient of the interaction term is larger in magnitude for the 1995-2005 period, 
probably due to the fact that the marginal returns of the investment are higher when 




Changes in specification. The model specified in Equation (1) is a dynamic 
specification where the lagged level of GDP enters as a regressor. This allows to test 
for convergence and to control for the initial conditions of the regions. Here we present 
the estimates of a more parsimonious version of the model, excluding the ln 𝑦𝑖,𝑡−1 
variable. Panel A in Table A4 shows that while the magnitude of the coefficient of 
some variables changes marginally, the main results are confirmed. Infrastructure 
investment alone is not significantly linked with regional GDP change; investment in 
secondary roads is more strongly linked to economic growth in regions with better 
government quality.   
 
Panel A of Table A4 demonstrates that our results are robust to the exclusion of some 
regressors. Panel B of Table A4 presents a more complete version of the model in 
Equation (1), with the inclusion of a new control variable. Models connecting transport 
infrastructure with economic growth typically rely on Cobb-Douglas production 
functions including private capital as one factor of production. Our original model does 
not control for private investment because data for this variable at the regional level is 
available only from 2000. Adding gross fixed capital formation as a proxy for the stock 
of private capital does not significantly alter the results (Table A4). One difference is 
that the coefficient of other roads investment is now positive and significant at 5 
percent level.8 This variable’s connection with economic growth becomes stronger if 
interacted with government quality.    
 
Endogeneity. The estimated effect of transport infrastructure and government quality 
on economic growth may be imprecise or biased if the direction of causality is running 
in the opposite way from that assumed in our model: i.e. if infrastructure investment 
and the quality of institutional structures are the consequences, not the causes, of the 
economic performance of EU regions.  
 
A vast body of literature has attempted to account for the potential endogeneity of 
infrastructure capital and institutional conditions by means of instrumental variables. 
Some studies have addressed endogeneity using time-lags as instruments with 
                                                          
8
 This difference with respect to previous results is not driven by the inclusion of private capital, 
but by the change in time-span (2000-2009). Estimating the model for this period without private 




Generalized Methods of Moments (GMM) estimation techniques (Calderón and 
Servén, 2004; Crescenzi and Rodríguez-Pose, 2012), while others have employed 
instruments based on historical factors correlated with the endogenous variables but 
exogenous to current economic conditions (Acemoglu et al., 2001; Tabellini, 2010 for 
institutions; Duranton and Turner 2011; 2012, for transport infrastructure).  
 
Our model includes two variables of interest which may be endogenous to economic 
growth, as well as the interaction term between them, making any identification 
strategy based on ‘external’ instruments complicated to apply. Moreover, data on 
historical variables for European regions is not readily available. Hence, in order to 
minimize endogeneity issues we resort to a dynamic panel analysis through a GMM-
system model.9 The GMM produces estimates in line with the results in Tables 2 and 4 
(Table A5). The quality of regional governments remains a significant driver of growth 
and the interaction term between other roads and government quality is positive and 
significantly associated with regional economic performance, although only at the 10 
percent level. Unlike the fixed effects results, the coefficient of infrastructure 
investment is not statistically significant, if the control variables are excluded from the 
model. 
 
This econometric approach is, however, unlikely to fully correct for the endogeneity 
issues of our model. As government quality is strongly path-dependent, time-lags do 
not represent valid sources of exogenous variation. Reverse causality, measurement 
errors and omitted variable remain an issue potentially biasing the results. For this 
reason, we cannot make any claim regarding the causality of the relationships 
observed. Hence, our results must be considered as a descriptive analysis of the 
complex set of relationships between transport infrastructure investment, government 
quality, and economic growth discussed in the introductory section of this paper.       
 
 
                                                          
9
 We choose a GMM-system over a GMM-difference model because it better accounts for the 
high persistence over time of the variables (Roodman, 2009). To make the number of 
instruments lower than the number of groups, we only use the second-order time lags as 
instruments and limit the regressors to the key variables of interest. As this implies excluding 
population –no longer controlling for ‘per capita’ effects – we replace the dependent variable with 
per capita GDP change. The GMM model is estimated for the full sample only because restricting 




This paper has investigated the importance of government quality for the economic 
returns of transport infrastructure investments in the European regions. We assumed 
that government institutions played a strong conditioning role on the effectiveness of 
public investments in road infrastructure and that government quality would also affect 
decisions and the returns of different types of roads: motorways vs. ordinary roads.  
 
The analysis, performed using these two different proxies for infrastructure investment 
and by interacting them with measures of institutional quality, unveils a very weak or 
insignificant direct correlation between economic growth and regional investments in 
either motorways or other roads, but a strong and highly significant connection with 
regional economic performance if other roads investment is interacted with 
government quality. The results hold for all different measures of government quality in 
our dataset. These findings suggest that, as hypothesized, positive rates of returns 
from infrastructure investment are mediated by the presence of adequate government 
institutions. Only certain types of transport infrastructure investment are associated 
with higher growth across the regions of Europe. In particular, improvements in 
secondary road network in sound government quality conditions are linked to higher 
growth. By contrast, the highly popular motorway development schemes which have 
been at the center of development strategies mainly in the periphery of Europe – and 
in particular in Portugal and Spain – are not associated with the expected economic 
outcomes, even if promoted by credible, competent and transparent local governments 
(which is not always the case). Government institutions also help translating 
investments in maintenance of transport infrastructure into economic growth. 
Maintenance investment alone is weakly associated to economic performance, and 
this association may even turn negative, if conducted in environments where 
corruption and collusion are rife. In all cases, government quality on its own or after 
controlling for human capital endowments and innovation has been more strongly 
linked to economic growth than transport infrastructure investment. 
 
These results can be partly ascribed to the differences in the two typologies of road 
infrastructure considered in our study. The category of other roads includes local and 
regional roads, whose construction tends to weigh less on public finances if compared 
to motorways expenditures and is often made to enhance within-region rather than 
between-region connectivity. This distinction is relevant especially for peripheral areas 
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located far away from the main urban centers and with fewer economic resources at 
their disposal. Their lower visibility and potential electoral dividends also make this 
type of investment more likely to respond to real needs and cost-benefit 
considerations. The glitzier large-scale motorway projects are more visible and 
generally yield greater electoral returns, but are costlier and may take away vital 
resources from other key infrastructure interventions or other development axes which 
could generate greater economic returns. 
 
When discussing the potential policy insights from these results, it is crucial to bear in 
mind some caveats. First, data constraints limit the possibility of drawing any causal 
conclusions from the analysis: time-varying omitted variables and reverse causality 
may still affect our estimates. Second, the time span covered is relatively limited, 
making it impossible to capture long-term growth trends. Third, our proxies for 
infrastructure investments are necessarily constrained by data availability: changes in 
road length of motorways and other roads, as well as national maintenance 
expenditures can be captured, but we cannot account for broader network effects 
(linked for example with the interactions between roads and railways or airports), traffic 
creation, and diversion effects.  
 
Having acknowledged these limitations, our findings still offer relevant insights for 
economic development policies in Europe. First, the results of the analysis contribute 
to the increasing number of studies recognizing improvements of local institutions as a 
necessary prerequisite for efficient public spending, in general, and infrastructure 
investment, in particular (Acemoglu and Dell, 2010; Rodríguez-Pose and Di Cataldo, 
2015; Rodríguez-Pose and Garcilazo, 2015). As Esfahani and Ramírez (2003) put it, 
“achieving better [economic] outcomes requires institutional and organizational reforms 
that are more fundamental than simply designing infrastructure projects and spending 
money on them” (Esfahani and Ramírez, 2003: 471). The re-shaping of institutional 
structures is a challenging task for policy-makers, as reforms will have to be designed 
specifically for the environment in which they are to be applied. In any case, our results 
indicate that ‘institution-building’ needs to be put at the top of the development agenda, 
if other types of development interventions – and, fundamentally, transport 




A potential way to limit distortions in public investment decisions determined by 
political interests, pork-barrel politics, or corruption may be to set stricter rules for 
project evaluation and provide technical guidance to local governments lacking the 
administrative capacity to select the most profitable projects. Ex-ante and ex-post 
evaluations, monitoring analyses and appraisals – despite increasing legislation in this 
respect – are not yet a consolidated practice in all European regions. Highly objective 
evaluation techniques are unappealing for local politicians regularly trying to exert their 
influence over the investment’s decisions (Short and Knopp, 2005). Regions with weak 
government institutions require a more thorough following of their transport projects 
over the full cycle and a greater awareness of project specificities. As argued by a 
recent US Transportation Research Board (TRB) report, a key capability of 
infrastructure monitoring agencies is to be able to distinguish between the short-term 
and the long-term benefits of transport projects. This allows setting timeliness and 
maintenance-of-effort requirements according to the type of goal to be achieved. 
Short-term and long-term targets may be assigned specific implementation rules, but a 
uniform evaluation framework is recommended for each project (TRB, 2014). In the EU 
enforcing effective evaluation frameworks should require greater levels of enforcement 
by the European institutions awarding financial resources for infrastructure 
interventions. One way to do so would be to truly condition the disbursement of EU 
funds for infrastructure investment to the application of technical regulations for project 
evaluations. 
 
Other policy implications of our analysis concern the type of transport investment more 
advisable for peripheral regions. Our empirical results challenge the vision, already 
disputed in the literature  (e.g. Puga, 2002), that one way to foster economic 
convergence in the EU is to link peripheral locations with the economic heart of the 
continent through the establishment of a core network of costly long-distance corridors 
of transport infrastructure. Conversely, our evidence supports the idea that, 
considering improvements in government quality, economically backward regions 
should strengthen regional roads in order to facilitate the creation of linkages between 
key local economic actors. In lagging areas, investing only in long-distance 
connections may provide incentives for the main economic assets of the region (being 
them skilled individuals or successful businesses) to re-locate elsewhere. Efforts to 
improve institutional conditions and promote local accessibility should be accompanied 




Overall, these policy indications are coherent with the ongoing reform of EU Cohesion 
Policy, increasingly prone to recognize different institutional capacities as drivers of 
persistent disparities and as major hindrances for regional convergence in Europe 
(Barca et al., 2012). Our findings indicate that considering place-based institutions as a 
key determinant of regional development may be the way forward to ensure effective 
development support, as long as it implies setting up consistent measures to condition 
the provision of additional funds on the proof of efficient spending from regional 
government authorities. Our results also suggest the need to pause and rethink about 
the interest and viability of many of the transportation policies financed with EU 
Structural Funds. Under the 2007-2013 budget period, almost half of EU Cohesion 
expenditures for transport infrastructure development were devoted to the realization 
of the Trans-European Transport Network (TEN-T), a planned set of road, rail, air, and 
maritime infrastructure investments that are intended to develop continuous North-
South and East-West corridors in the continent. Despite a decline in infrastructure 
investment, transport infrastructure still attracts a considerable percentage of the 
almost €352 billion of Cohesion Policy for the period 2014-2020. A very large share of 
these funds has been or will be spent in lagging areas of Europe, precisely those 
where our analysis suggests that, unless there are significant improvements in 
government quality, the association of these funds with economic growth is likely to be 
limited. A coherent shift to a place-based approach to regional development should 
induce a thorough rethink of how new transport infrastructure investments can best 
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ON LINE Appendix 
TABLE A1: Variables description 
Variable  Source Definition and notes 
Change of log GDP OECD Statistics First difference of the natural logarithm of regional GDP in current euros, 1995-2009. Data for Romanian 
regions obtained from Eurostat. 
Lagged GDP  OECD Statistics Natural logarithm of regional GDP lagged by one period. 
Investment in motorways  Own calculation using Eurostat 
data 
First difference of the number of kms of motorways, standardized by thousand regional inhabitants. 
Investment in other roads  Own calculation using Eurostat 
data 
First difference of the number of kms of regional roads not classified as motorways, standardized by thousand 




Spending on preservation of the existing transport network and maintenance expenditure financed by public 
administrations. Data at the national level, 1995-2009. Current euros as percentage of national GDP. 
Maintenance expenditures for road, rail, inland waterways, maritime ports and airports. Missing values for the 
Netherlands, Germany and Spain. 
Road maintenance  OECD Statistics 
Investment and maintenance expenditures for roads as percentage of GDP. Data at the national level, 1995-
2009. Current euros as percentage of national GDP. Missing values for Germany and Spain. 
Quality of Government (QoG)  
Own calculation with QoG Institute 
data and World Bank Governance 
Indicators 
EU Quality of Government (QoG) index elaborated by the University of Gothenburg, a survey-based index 
constructed around three main pillars: quality of education, public health care and law enforcement; impartiality 
in education, public health and legal protection; level of corruption in education, health care and the legal 
system. This index has been extended to the 1997-2009 period  adopting the World Bank Governance 
Indicators developed by Kauffmann et al. (2009). See Charron et al. (2012) for a detailed explanation on how 
the index was constructed. 
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Control of Corruption 
Own calculation with QoG Institute 
data and World Bank Governance 
Indicators 
Section of the QoG combined index based on the calculated score from the answers of its inhabitants to the 
following questions: ‘Corruption is prevalent in my area’s local public school system.’ (0-10); ‘Corruption is 
prevalent in the public healthcare system in my area.’ (0-10); ‘In the past 12 months have you or anyone living 
in your household paid a bribe in any form to: health or medical services?’ (y/n); ‘In your opinion, how often do 
you think other citizens in your area use bribery to obtain public services?’ (0-10) 
Rule of Law 
Own calculation with QoG Institute 
data and World Bank Governance 
Indicators 
Section of the QoG combined index based on the calculated score from the answers of its inhabitants to the 
following questions: ‘how would you rate the quality of the police force in your area?’ (0-10); ‘The police force 
gives special advantages to certain people in my area.’ (0-10); ‘All citizens are treated equally by the police 
force in my area’ (1-4); ‘Corruption is prevalent in the police force in my area’ (0-10). 
Government Effectiveness 
Own calculation with QoG Institute 
data and World Bank Governance 
Indicators 
Section of the QoG combined index based on the calculated score from the answers of its inhabitants to the 
following questions: ‘how would you rate the quality of public education in your area?’ (0-10); ‘how would you 
rate the quality of the public healthcare system in your area?’ (0-10); ‘Certain people are given special 
advantages in the public education system in my area’  (0-10); ‘Certain people are given special advantages in 
the public healthcare system in my area.’ ( 0-10); ‘All citizens are treated equally in the public education system 
in my area.’ (1-4); ‘All citizens are treated equally in the public healthcare system in my area.’ (1-4). 
Government Accountability 
Own calculation with QoG Institute 
data and World Bank Governance 
Indicators 
Section of the QoG combined index based on the calculated score from the answers of its inhabitants to the 
following questions: ‘In your opinion, if corruption by a public employee or politician were to occur in your area, 
how likely is it that such corruption would be exposed by the local mass media?’ (0-10); ‘Please respond to the 
following: Elections in my area are honest and clean from corruption.’ (0-10).  
Spatial Weight of investment in 
motorways/other roads 
Own calculation with Eurostat 
Spatially weighted average of first difference of transport infrastructure endowment in neighboring regions, 
calculated with an Euclidean distance matrix setting the threshold at the minimum distance for each region to 
have at least one neighbor. 
Agricultural employment Eurostat Share of regional employment in NACE categories A (Agriculture, forestry and fishing) and B (Mining and 
quarrying). 
Patent applications
 Eurostat Natural logarithm of the number of applications filled for patents of all types per thousand of inhabitants. 
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Human capital Eurostat Natural logarithm of the percentage of employed people (aged 25-64) with completed higher education 
(ISCED-97 levels 5 and 6). 
Regional population Eurostat Thousands of residents in the region. 
Gross fixed capital formation Eurostat Resident producers´ acquisitions, less disposals, of fixed tangible or intangible assets. Hundred million euros of 
national currency (current prices). Available 2000-2009. 
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TABLE A2: Descriptive statistics 
 
All regions Less developed regions 
Variable Obs Mean Std. Dev. Obs Mean Std. Dev. 
Regional GDP 2490 67062 86939 1050 34572 36196 
Kms of motorways 2421 321 387 1012 219 374 
Kms of other roads 2321 19273 17695 966 14785 9523 
Motorways per thousand inhabitants 2459 0.142 0.134 1030 0.093 0.127 
Other roads per thousand inhabitants 2321 9.555 8.273 966 8.285 6.586 
Change in motorways per thousand inhabitants 
(investment  in motorways)  
2293 0.0033 0.012 960 0.005 0.014 
Change in other roads per thousand inhabitants 
(investment in other roads)  
2150 0.013 0.272 893 0.029 0.218 
Transport infrastructure maintenance  1811 0.644 0.530 809 0.794 0.591 
Road maintenance  1967 0.351 0.267 809 0.460 0.263 
Quality of Government Index 2490 0.169 0.960 1050 -0.420 1.017 
Control of Corruption 2490 0.128 0.924 1050 -0.445 0.908 
Rule of Law 2490 0.169 0.938 1050 -0.376 0.982 
Government Effectiveness 2489 0.196 1.035 1050 -0.406 1.134 
Government Accountability 2489 0.125 0.951 1050 -0.410 1.049 
Spatial Weight of investment in motorways 2324 0.0033 0.0054 980 0.0042 0.0065 
Spatial Weight of investment in other roads 2312 0.068 0.43 968 0.123 0.613 
Agricultural employment 2490 7.807 9.20 1050 13.11 11.92 
Patent applications 2490 70.27 93.57 1050 16.76 33.33 
Human capital 2454 21.83 9.06 1018 18.06 7.86 
Regional population  2490 2639 2470 1050 2248 1533 





TABLE A3: Robustness checks – Change of time-span 
Dep. variable: 





Motorways Other roads Motorways Other roads 
FS LDR FS LDR FS LDR FS LDR 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
Lagged GDP 
-0.164*** -0.213*** -0.162*** -0.217*** -0.101*** -0.141*** -0.0977*** -0.143*** 
(0.0181) (0.0256) (0.0205) (0.0277) (0.0190) (0.0301) (0.0183) (0.0295) 
Investment in motorways  
0.127** 0.0435   0.0362 -0.0994   
(0.0606) (0.105)   (0.0525) (0.0733)   
Investment in other roads  
  0.00124 0.00182   0.000745 0.000840 
  (0.000883) (0.00172)   (0.000464) (0.000508) 
Quality of Government (QoG) 
0.0366*** 0.0487*** 0.0254*** 0.0483*** 0.0266*** 0.0597*** 0.0263*** 0.0630*** 
(0.00667) (0.0134) (0.00576) (0.0127) (0.00472) (0.00787) (0.00470) (0.00798) 
Interaction term 
Investment in motorways × QoG
 
-0.113 -0.185   -0.0775 -0.123   
(0.0874) (0.134)   (0.0781) (0.108)   
Interaction term 
Investment in other roads × QoG 
  0.00796*** 0.0124*   0.00208*** 0.00365*** 
  (0.00295) (0.00695)   (0.000782) (0.00108) 
Spatial Weight of investment in 
motorways 
0.627*** 0.453**   0.510*** 0.163   
(0.155) (0.192)   (0.165) (0.231)   
Spatial Weight of investment in other 
roads 
  0.00641*** 0.00426*   0.00346** 0.00296 
  (0.00168) (0.00222)   (0.00151) (0.00200) 
Agricultural employment  
-0.00298*** -0.00334*** -0.00383*** -0.00377*** -0.00441*** -0.00445*** -0.00437*** -0.00445*** 
(0.000954) (0.00124) (0.000838) (0.00116) (0.000736) (0.00101) (0.000723) (0.00102) 
Patent applications 
0.00506*** 0.00290 0.00324* 0.00263 0.00799*** 0.0106*** 0.00943*** 0.0122*** 
(0.00178) (0.00328) (0.00165) (0.00279) (0.00246) (0.00326) (0.00245) (0.00322) 
Human capital 
0.0186*** 0.0371*** 0.0157*** 0.0359*** 0.0109 0.0481*** 0.00960 0.0467*** 
(0.00452) (0.0102) (0.00497) (0.0134) (0.00841) (0.0147) (0.00849) (0.0152) 
Regional population 
-2.17e-05* -1.31e-05 -1.71e-05 6.74e-07 -1.91e-05** 1.33e-06 -1.80e-05** 9.22e-06 
(1.24e-05) (2.52e-05) (1.19e-05) (2.26e-05) (7.67e-06) (1.06e-05) (7.64e-06) (9.05e-06) 
Region Dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year Dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations  1,625 672 1,496 612 1,798 750 1,754 726 
R
2 
within 0.218 0.235 0.242 0.264 0.505 0.494 0.506 0.508 
NUTS regions 166 70 161 66 166 70 161 66 
Notes: FS = full sample; LDR = less developed regions. Clustered standard errors in parentheses; *** 
p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. 
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TABLE A4: Robustness checks – Change of specification 
Dep. variable: 
Change of log GDP  
Panel A 
Estimates without inclusion of lagged GDP 
Panel B 
Control for private capital investment (2000-2009) 
Motorways Other roads Motorways Other roads 
FS LDR FS LDR FS LDR FS LDR 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
Lagged GDP 
    -0.142*** -0.200*** -0.140*** -0.203*** 
    (0.0218) (0.0307) (0.0213) (0.0298) 
Investment in motorways 
0.0616 -0.0721   0.0275 -0.0570   
(0.0564) (0.0785)   (0.0527) (0.0750)   
Investment in other roads  
  0.000492 0.000325   0.00105** 0.00115** 
  (0.000520) (0.000545)   (0.000448) (0.000503) 
Quality of Government (QoG) 
0.0276*** 0.0414*** 0.0191*** 0.0394*** 0.0308*** 0.0672*** 0.0310*** 0.0712*** 
(0.00336) (0.00559) (0.00323) (0.00537) (0.00516) (0.0113) (0.00514) (0.0114) 
Interaction term 
Investment in motorways × QoG
 
-0.0606 -0.100   -0.0772 -0.0615   
(0.0773) (0.103)   (0.0769) (0.114)   
Interaction term 
Investment in other roads × QoG 
  0.00227** 0.00358***   0.00231*** 0.00401*** 
  (0.000887) (0.00106)   (0.000831) (0.00122) 
Spatial Weight of investment in 
motorways 
0.677*** 0.454**   0.434** 0.0876   
(0.148) (0.188)   (0.171) (0.240)   
Spatial Weight of investment in 
other roads 
  0.00421** 0.00415*   0.00264* 0.00194 
  (0.00168) (0.00217)   (0.00154) (0.00196) 
Agricultural employment  
-0.00122*** -0.000962** -0.00187*** -0.00139*** -0.00468*** -0.00445*** -0.00466*** -0.00445*** 
(0.000357) (0.000427) (0.000319) (0.000440) (0.000924) (0.00115) (0.000906) (0.00113) 
Patent applications 
0.00358** 0.00372 0.00214 0.00352 0.00753*** 0.0121*** 0.00893*** 0.0136*** 
(0.00166) (0.00289) (0.00180) (0.00306) (0.00271) (0.00351) (0.00267) (0.00344) 
Human capital 
0.0103** 0.0196** 0.00704 0.0158 0.0135 0.0435** 0.0135 0.0428** 
(0.00416) (0.00759) (0.00450) (0.00953) (0.00990) (0.0176) (0.0101) (0.0182) 
Regional population 
-2.29e-05*** -1.69e-05* -2.59e-05*** -1.33e-05* -3.66e-05*** -0.000110** -3.28e-05*** -9.98e-05** 
(6.05e-06) (9.57e-06) (6.04e-06) (7.13e-06) (1.19e-05) (4.96e-05) (1.20e-05) (4.88e-05) 
Gross fixed capital formation 
    7.59e-05** 0.000481** 6.99e-05* 0.000471** 
    (3.66e-05) (0.000205) (3.71e-05) (0.000203) 
Region Dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year Dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations  2,269 936 2,134 876 1,535 662 1,498 642 
R
2 
within 0.429 0.404 0.445 0.421 0.527 0.521 0.527 0.536 
NUTS regions 166 70 161 66 166 70 161 66 
Notes: FS = full sample; LDR = less developed regions. Clustered standard errors in parentheses; *** 
p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. 
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TABLE A5: GMM estimates 
Dep. variable: 
Change of log per capita GDP  
GMM-system (2
nd
 order lags as instruments) 
  
 (1) (2) 
Lagged per capita GDP 
-0.0305*** -0.0494*** 
(0.00499) (0.00757) 
Investment in motorways  
-0.0192  
(0.138)  
Investment  in other roads  
 -0.00452 
 (0.00328) 









Investment in other roads × QoG 
 0.0122* 
 (0.00724) 
Spatial Weight of investment in motorways 
0.518*  
(0.273)  
Spatial Weight of investment in other roads 
 0.0235*** 
 (0.00672) 
Year Dummies Yes Yes 
Observations 2,289 2,158 
NUTS regions 166 161 
Instruments 136 140 
AR (2) test (p-value) 0.85 (0.393) 0.36 (0.719) 




TABLE A6: Motorways investment, quality of government components and regional growth, 
1995-2009 
Dep. variable: 
Change of log GDP 
Quality of Government (QoG) Component 
Control of Corruption Rule of Law Government Effectiveness Government Accountability 
FS LDR FS LDR FS LDR FS LDR 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
Lagged GDP  
-0.0901*** -0.117*** -0.0952*** -0.110*** -0.0886*** -0.104*** -0.0787*** -0.0890*** 
(0.0130) (0.0215) (0.0132) (0.0204) (0.0124) (0.0187) (0.0128) (0.0208) 
Investment in motorways  
0.0640 -0.0837 0.0752 -0.0500 0.0695 -0.0353 0.0707 -0.0737 
(0.0496) (0.0729) (0.0528) (0.0825) (0.0527) (0.0647) (0.0511) (0.0715) 
Quality of Government (QoG) 
Component 
0.0254*** 0.0449*** 0.0275*** 0.0347*** 0.0215*** 0.0384*** 0.00611** 0.0121*** 
(0.00409) (0.00832) (0.00394) (0.00804) (0.00280) (0.00460) (0.00273) (0.00387) 
Interaction term 
Investment in motorways × 
QoG 
 
-0.0703 -0.0896 -0.0797 -0.134 -0.0298 -0.114 -0.0650 -0.0334 
(0.0736) (0.103) (0.0786) (0.110) (0.0594) (0.0857) (0.0588) (0.0632) 
         
Spatial Weight of change in 
investment in motorways 
0.714*** 0.439** 0.771*** 0.291 0.731*** 0.524*** 0.745*** 0.552*** 
(0.149) (0.184) (0.158) (0.199) (0.163) (0.188) (0.154) (0.195) 
Agricultural employment  
-0.00244*** -0.00248*** -0.00308*** -0.00309*** -0.00293*** -0.00319*** -0.00265*** -0.00308*** 
(0.000669) (0.000843) (0.000655) (0.000777) (0.000648) (0.000826) (0.000679) (0.000808) 
Patent applications 
0.00592*** 0.00673** 0.00609*** 0.00584** 0.00624*** 0.00677** 0.00480*** 0.00558* 
(0.00179) (0.00290) (0.00177) (0.00267) (0.00167) (0.00294) (0.00174) (0.00284) 
Human capital 
0.0107** 0.0296*** 0.0202*** 0.0348*** 0.0124*** 0.0387*** 0.0132*** 0.0266** 
(0.00472) (0.00997) (0.00459) (0.00933) (0.00471) (0.01000) (0.00495) (0.0101) 
Regional population 
-2.33e-05*** -2.41e-05** -1.66e-05** -1.35E-05 -1.25e-05 9.04e-06 -2.54e-05*** -2.43e-05** 
(6.54e-06) (9.57e-06) (7.09e-06) (1.06e-05) (7.69e-06) (1.19e-05) (7.20e-06) (1.09e-05) 
Region Dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year Dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations  2,269 936 2,269 936 2,269 936 2,269 936 
R
2
 0.470 0.430 0.484 0.451 0.481 0.423 0.466 0.409 
NUTS regions 166 70 166 70 166 70 166 70 
Notes: FS = full sample; LDR = less developed regions. Clustered standard errors in parentheses; *** 




TABLE A7: Other roads investment, quality of government components and regional 
growth, 1995-2009  
Dep. variable: 
Change of log GDP 
Quality of Government (QoG) Component 
Control of Corruption Rule of Law Government Effectiveness Government Accountability 
FS LDR FS LDR FS LDR FS LDR 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
Lagged GDP  
-0.0910*** -0.131*** -0.0872*** -0.109*** -0.0877*** -0.109*** -0.0816*** -0.0934*** 
(0.0142) (0.0232) (0.0139) (0.0220) (0.0135) (0.0197) (0.0139) (0.0213) 
Investment in other roads 
0.000831 0.000914* 0.000228 -0.000188 0.000893* 0.000859* 0.000508 0.000377 
(0.000509) (0.000516) (0.000525) (0.000559) (0.000480) (0.000507) (0.000447) (0.000466) 
Quality of Government (QoG) 
Component 
0.0212*** 0.0503*** 0.0132*** 0.0272*** 0.0181*** 0.0375*** -0.000716 0.00835* 
(0.00431) (0.00953) (0.00347) (0.00698) (0.00257) (0.00445) (0.00266) (0.00498) 
Interaction term 
Investment in other roads ×  
QoG 
 
0.00195** 0.00374*** 0.00267*** 0.00445*** 0.00212** 0.00273*** 0.00285*** 0.00352*** 
(0.000965) (0.00116) (0.00101) (0.00151) (0.000816) (0.000918) (0.00103) (0.00116) 
         
Spatial Weight of investment in 
other roads 
0.00351** 0.00402* 0.00342** 0.00320 0.00346** 0.00200 0.00317** 0.00317* 
(0.00159) (0.00214) (0.00154) (0.00194) (0.00149) (0.00194) (0.00147) (0.00186) 
Agricultural employment  
-0.00324*** -0.00295*** -0.00359*** -0.00367*** -0.00364*** -0.00362*** -0.00346*** -0.00363*** 
(0.000643) (0.000889) (0.000641) (0.000825) (0.000610) (0.000759) (0.000648) (0.000805) 
Patent applications 
0.00491*** 0.00675** 0.00451** 0.00630** 0.00529*** 0.00567** 0.00355* 0.00495* 
(0.00187) (0.00287) (0.00187) (0.00300) (0.00178) (0.00274) (0.00184) (0.00291) 
Human capital 
0.0102** 0.0305** 0.0143*** 0.0338*** 0.0111** 0.0338*** 0.00948* 0.0227* 
(0.00502) (0.0127) (0.00500) (0.0127) (0.00496) (0.0113) (0.00516) (0.0119) 
Regional population 
-2.33e-05*** -2.01e-05** -1.66e-05** -1.21e-05 -1.25e-05 1.29e-05 -4.46e-05*** -2.19e-05** 
(6.54e-06) (7.85e-06) (7.09e-06) (8.12e-06) (7.69e-06) (9.26e-06) (1.21e-05) (8.89e-06) 
Region Dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year Dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations  2,134 876 2,134 876 2,134 876 2,134 876 
R
2
 0.470 0.460 0.484 0.438 0.481 0.459 0.466 0.431 
NUTS regions 161 66 161 66 161 66 161 66 
Notes: FS = full sample; LDR = less developed regions. Clustered standard errors in parentheses; *** 
p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. 
 
